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MARYLAND STATE BAR ASSOCIATION
PROPOSED PATTERN JURY CHARGES:
PRODUCT LIABILITY ©
This is a tentative draft of proposed pattern jury instructions
prepared by The Section of Judicial Administration, Commit-
tee on Pattern Jury Instructions of the Maryland State Bar
Association. The Committee emphasizes that the pattern jury
instructions are suggestions for the courts' consideration and are
not intended to be mandatory. Comments and suggestions are
invited by the Committee with respect to the draft product
liability instructions. t
PRODUCT LIABILITY
A. Liability for Negligence
1. Manufacturer's Liability
2. Retailer's (Dealer) or Wholesaler's Distributor Duty to Inspect As
to Defects
3. Patent Danger
4. Supplier's Duty to Warn
5. Repairer of Equipment
6. Lessor or Bailor for Hire's Liability
7. User's Duty
B. Liability for Warranty
1. Express Warranty
2. Implied Warranty of Merchantability
3. Implied Warranty of Fitness For a Particular Purpose
4. Implied Warranty of Wholesomeness of Food and Bottled
Beverages
5. Notice of Breach of Warranty
6. Special Limiting Effects-Defenses
7. Definitions
C. Strict Liability in Tort
1. Elements of Liability
2. Unreasonably Dangerous Condition-Defined
A. LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENCE
1. Manufacturer's Liability
The manufacturer of a product that is likely to be dangerous if
negligently made, has a duty to exercise reasonable care in the [design]
© Copyright 1976, Maryland State Bar Association
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[manufacture] [testing] and [inspection] of the product [and in the
testing and inspection of any component parts made by another] so
that the product may be safely used in a manner and for a purpose for
which it was made and for which the manufacturer knew or should
have known that those likely to use it would not realize the dangerous
condition of the product. The duty includes the obligation to exercise
reasonable care to warn or otherwise inform of the dangerous
condition.
A failure to fulfill that duty is negligence.
Comment: Only the applicable bracket(s) should be used. This
instruction is essentially a standard negligence instruction but it does
state more particularly the degree of care required of a manufacturer.
On the question of the likelihood of the product to be dangerous, see
Babylon v. Scruton, 215 Md. 299, 138 A.2d 375 (1958); Volkswagen
of America, Inc. v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 321 A.2d 737 (1974); See
also Frericks v. General Motors Corp., 274 Md. 288, 336 A.2d 118
(1975) (These last two cases illustrate parameters of intended purpose
of motor vehicles).
Concerning motor vehicles in "second collision" situations: "an
automobile manufacturer is liable for a defect in design which the
manufacturer could have reasonably foreseen would cause or enhance
injuries on impact which is not patent or obvious to the user, and which
in fact leads to or enhances the injuries in an automobile collision."
Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Young, supra at 272 Md. 216; see also
Frericks v. General Motors Corp., supra.
For care in design, manufacturing, testing and inspection, see
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §§ 395, 398 and 396 (1965)
respectively. As respects component parts, see 3 A.L.R.3d 1016.
Concerning the specific defect which is the essence of most product
liability litigation, a plaintiff, aside from proof of such, must prove that
the contended defect was in the product when it left the control of the
manufacturer. Giant Food, Inc. v. Washington Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,
273 Md. 592, 332 A.2d 1 (1975).
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may be invoked where the liability
of a manufacturer is predicated on negligence, but for case appropriate-
ness, see Giant Food, Inc. v. Washington Coca-Cola Bottling Co., supra;
Leikach v. Royal Crown, 261 Md. 541, 276 A.2d 81 (1971); and,
Undeck v. Consumer's Discount Supermarket, Inc.,_ Md. App.
__ A.2d - (1975).
Concerning a continuing duty to warn of dangerous defects after the
product has been sold and to develop and supply curative devices for
dangerous products already sold, see Rekab v. Hurbetz, 261 Md. 141,
274 A.2d 107 (1971). See also Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Curtiss-Wright
Corp., 441 F.2d 451 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 82 (1969).
a. Duty of Component Maker or Material Processor
The [maker of a component part] [processor of materials] incor-
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porated into a product finished or assembled by another has the same
duty of care as to such [component parts] [materials] as that of a
manufacturer.
Addendum:
A manufacturer who uses in his product any [material, part]
manufactured by another is under a duty to make such inspections and
tests of the [material, part] as a reasonably careful manufacturer in his
business should recognize as necessary to secure a finished product
reasonably safe for its intended use. The duty to inspect and test exists
even though the [material, part] was obtained from a reputable
[producer, manufacturer]. The failure to [make, exercise reasonable
care in making] such inspections and tests is negligence.
Comment: RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 395, comment m
(1965). See, e.g., E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. McCain, 414 F.2d
369 (5th Cir. 1969).
b. Duty of Seller Assuming Role of Manufacturer
One who puts out as his own product an article manufactured by
another has the same duty of care as that of manufacturer.
Comment: This instruction should be used in a case involving a
product which is completely made by one other than the person who
holds himself out as manufacturer.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 400 (1965).
2. Retailer's (Dealer) or Wholesaler's (Distributor)
Duty to Inspect and Test as to Defects
A seller of a product, which was made by another, has a duty to
make a reasonable inspection of the product for possible defects and to
make such tests for defects therein as are reasonably necessary to assure
safety of the product sold. [See Comment below].
A failure to fulfill any such duty is negligence.
Comment: Instruction VIII A 1 b should be used if the seller markets
the product as his own manufacture.
A manufacturer clearly has a duty to make a reasonable inspection of
the product for defects and to make such tests for defects therein as are
reasonably necessary to assure safety of the product manufactured
prior to dissemination. However, a seller's duty to inspect is more
limited than that of the manufacturer. Thus, the instruction should be
adapted to specific cases; and, in so doing, could consider the use of the
following:
(1) In the sale in a sealed package or closed container of a product
manufactured by another the seller has no duty to open the package or
container and inspect or test the contents unless the condition of the
1975]
package or container is such as to indicate to the ordinary person the
possibility of a defect in or a danger from the contents.
(2)(a) A seller of food in other than sealed containers has a duty to
test for impurities and contamination that would be discoverable by
any usual and ordinary test.
(b) In the sale of a bottled product manufactured by another in a
container, the seller has a duty to make a reasonable inspection of the
container itself for defects therein.
(3)(a) In the sale of [new and used automobiles] [automotive
supplies and equipment] [inflammables] [business and industrial
equipment] [domestic and household furnishings, supplies, appliances
and equipment] [wearing apparel] a seller has a duty to make a
reasonable inspection of the product for any defect therein.
(b) In the sale of new and used automobiles, a dealer has a duty to
make reasonable tests for defects which would render the vehicle unsafe
for use.
A seller ordinarily is not obligated to inspect a product for latent
defects and a seller has no duty to test for latent defects in a product,
at least where he has obtained the product from a reputable
manufacturer and there is nothing to indicate to him any special need
for testing. As the court stated in Frericks v. General Motors Corp., 274
Md. 288, 336 A.2d 118 (1975):
If a dealer knows that a particular part of a car is defectively
designed, or if in the exercise of reasonable care he should have
known of or discovered the defective design, he has the same
liability in negligence as the manufacturer [Citation omitted].
But since it cannot be presumed from the mere existence of the
defective design that the dealer had or should have had the
requisite knowledge, it is necessary that such knowledge be
specifically alleged.
Yet, in an appropriate case, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur might be
invocable where the liability of a retailer is premised on negligence. See
Giant Food, Inc. v. Washington Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 273 Md. 592,
332 A.2d 1 (1975).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §§'401, 402 (1965). See also 6
A.L.R.3d 12.
3. Patent Danger
A manufacturer must produce an article which will function properly
for the purpose for which it was intended, and which is free from
hidden defects or concealed dangers. However, the manufacturer need
not guard against injury to others from a danger which is apparent to
the user [or supply safety devices to guard against such dangers.]
Comment: See also VIII Product Liability A.1. Patten v. Logemann
Bros. Co., 263 Md. 364, 283 A.2d 567 (1971); Blankenship v. Morrison
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Mach. Co., 255 Md. 241, 257 A.2d 430 (1969); Myers v. Montgomery
Ward & Co., 253 Md. 282, 232 A.2d 855 (1969). Cf. Volkswagen of
America, Inc. v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 321 A.2d 737 (1974).
For definition of latent-patent, see Katz Arundel-Brooks Concrete
Corp., 220 Md. 200, 515 A.2d 731 (1959); Babylon v. Scruton, 215
Md. 299, 138 A.2d 375 (1958).
4. Supplier's Duty to Warn
A supplier of a product [directly or through a third person] who
knows or by the exercise of reasonable care should know the product is
potentially dangerous to users has a duty to give adequate warning of
the dangers.
A failure to fulfill that duty is negligence.
This rule applies to a (insert type of supplier) of a product.
Comment: This instruction is applicable to all persons supplying
chattels for the use of others, whether as manufacturer, seller, lessor, or
bailor, either for hire or gratuitiously.
Moran v. Faberge, Inc., 273 Md. 538, 322 A.2d 11 (1975) enunciates
the principle and discusses it parameters. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS, § 388 (1965); and specifically, duty to warn of manufacturer,
of seller, and of lessor and bailor, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS,
§§ 394, 399-401 and 407 (1965) respectively. See also Rekab, Inc. v.
Frank Hrubetz & Co., 261 Md. 141, 274 A.2d 107 (1971); Levin v.
Walter Kidde & Co., 251 Md. 560, 248 A.2d 151 (1968)-requirement
is only to give a reasonable warning, not the best possible warning. The
obviousness of the danger to the user is a factor to be considered in
determining the adequacy of the warning.
For helpful annotations, see 76 A.L.R.2d 9 and 80 A.L.R.2d 488.
5. Repairer of Equipment
A contractor who undertakes to make repairs on a [state kind of
equipment], which are of such a nature that if defectively made they
are likely to render the [equipment] dangerous when used, is under a
duty to exercise reasonable care in repairing the defects so that the
[equipment] after repair will be reasonably safe for use.
A failure to fulfill that duty is negligence.
Comment: Cf. Erdman v. Johnson Bros. Radio & Television Co., 260
Md. 190, 271 A.2d 744 (1970).
6. Lessor or Bailor For Hire's Liability
The [lessor] [bailor] of a product must use reasonable care to make
it safe. If the [lessor] [bailor] does not provide a safe article, he must
warn of the product's potential danger.
A failure to fulfill that duty is negligence.
Comment: Instruction VIII A. 6. b. should be used if there is an issue
whether bailment is for hire or is gratuitous.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 408 (1965).
7. User's Duty
A user has a duty to use ordinary care for his own safety and
protection. He must exercise such care with reference to those apparent
defects or dangerous conditions about which he knows and understands
or about which he should know and understand. He also has a duty to
use a product in accordance with adequate instructions and warnings,
and to use the product in a reasonable manner.
Failure to fulfill any of these duties constitutes negligence.
Comment: The instruction is applicable only in those cases where
liability is predicated on negligence and the defendant contends that
the user failed to observe defects or dangerous conditions, failed to use
the product according to the manufacturer's direction and warning, or
used the product in an abnormal manner.
The traditional rule of contributory negligence precluding recovery
in negligence cases is fully applicable to products liability cases based
on negligence.
Moreover, a manufacturer may be released from liability in the
event of an improper use of the product or by reason of a substantial
modification of the product. See Marker v. Universal Oil Prods. Co.,
250 F.2d 603 (10th Cir. 1957); Young v. Aeroil Prods. Co., 248 F.2d
185 (9th Cir. 1957).
B. LIABILITY FOR WARRANTY
1. Express Warranty-Defined
Any statement [or promise] of fact made by the seller to the buyer
which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain
creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the
statement or promise. Such statement [or promise] may be oral or in
writing.
[Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis of the
bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the
description.]
[Any sample or model which is made part of the basis of the bargain
creates an express warranty that the whole of the goods shall conform
to the sample or model.]
No particular words are necessary to create an express warranty, nor
is it necessary that the seller use formal words such as "warrant" or
"guarantee" or that he have a specific intention to make a warranty.
[No statement of the value of the goods shall be construed to create
a warranty.] [No statement purporting to be merely the seller's opinion
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or commendation of the goods shall be construed to create a
warranty.]
A seller who breaches this warranty is liable to a person who sustains
injury as a result of the breach.
Comment: MD. ANN. CODE, Comm. L. Art., § 2-313 (1975). See
McCarty v. E. J. Korvette, Inc., -Md. App. -, 347 A.2d 253 (1975).
Concerning requisites for warranty recovery, see Sheeskin v. Giant
Food, Inc., 20 Md. App. 611, 318 A.2d 874 (1974), aff'd Giant Food,
Inc. v. Washington Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 273 Md. 592, 332 A.2d 1
(1975).
a. Statement of Opinion
An opinion is the expression of a conclusion or judgment which does
not purport to be based on actual knowledge. In determining whether a
particular statement is one of fact or merely an expression of opinion,
the surrounding circumstances under which it was made, the manner in
which the statement was made, the ordinary effect of the words used,
the relationship of the parties, and the subject matter with which the
statement was concerned are to be considered.
2. Implied Warranty of Merchantability
In a sale of goods such as that which [is claimed] occurred in this
case, there is an implied warranty that the goods are fit for the ordinary
purposes for which they are intended to be used [and shall at least
conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the container
or label, if any.]
A seller who breaches this warranty is liable to a person who sustains
injury as a result.
Comment: MD. ANN. CODE, Comm. L. Art., § 2-314 (1975). See Myers
v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 253 Md. 282, 252 A.2d 855 (1969) for
limiting factors. Giant Food, Inc. v. Washington Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,
273 Md. 592, 332 A.2d 1 (1975). See also Sheeskin v. Giant Food, Inc.,
20 Md. App. 611, 318 A.2d 874 (1974).
Note that the implied warranty of merchantability arises from the
fact of a sale, whereas the implied warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose has to do with the particular purposes envisaged by the buyer
and seller in an individual transaction.
Concerning motor vehicles in "second collision" situations, the
elements of a breach of warranty action are essentially the same as
those of a negligence action, that is, a warranty that an automobile is
"fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used" includes
a promise that "a reasonable measure of safety" has been provided
when collisions do occur. Frericks v. General Motors Corp., 274 Md.
288, 336 A.2d 118 (1975).
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a. Implied Warranty of Merchantability
in Contracts Other Than Sales
When goods are supplied under a contract [to] [for] [of]
there is an implied warranty that the goods will be reasonably suitable
for the purposes for which they are ordinarily used.
Comment: MD. ANN. CODE, Comm. L. Art., § 2-314 (1975). Cf. Bona v.
Graefe, 264 Md. 69, 285 A.2d 607 (1972).
3. Implied Warranty of Fitness For a Particular Purpose
A seller who at the time of the sale knows or has reason to know of
the purpose for which the goods are required and who knows or has
reason to know that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment
to select or furnish suitable goods, impliedly warrants that the goods
furnished are fit for the intended purpose.
A seller who breaches this warranty is liable to a person who sustains
injury as a result.
Comment: MD. ANN. CODE, Comm. L. Art., § 2-315. See, e.g., Fred J.
Miller, Inc. v. Raymond Metal Prods. Co., 265 Md. 523, 290 A.2d 527
(1972). Cf. Myers v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 253 Md. 292, 252 A.2d
855 (1969).
4. Implied Warranty of Wholesomeness of Food and Bottled Beverages
When [articles of food] [bottled beverages] for immediate human
consumption are [manufactured] [packed] [bottled] by a [manu-
facturer] [packer] [bottler] and by a series of transactions reach a
retailer who sells to the consumer, each intermediate dealer, as well as
the manufacturer and retailer, impliedly warrants that such [article]
[beverage] is reasonably fit for immediate human consumption.
[[Food] [bottled beverage] is not reasonably fit for human
consumption when it contains a foreign substance, which is likely to
cause injury to the consumer.]
[[Food is reasonably fit for human consumption although it may
contain a bone or other substance which is natural to that type of food
and might reasonably be anticipated by the consumer.] Only those
substances which are not natural to the type of [food] [bottled
beverage] concerned may be classed as foreign substances. It is for you
to decide from the evidence whether there was a foreign substance in
the item involved in this case at the time it was [sold to] [and]
[consumed by] the plaintiff.]
Comment: Only the applicable bracket(s) should be used.
This warranty is actually part of the implied warranty of merchanta-
bility under MD. ANN. CODE, Comm. L. Art., § 2-314: "fitness for the
ordinary purposes for which such goods are used." For instructive
pre-Code cases see Vaccarino v. Cozzubo, 181 Md. 614, 31 A.2d 316
[Vol. 5
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(1943); Child's Dining Hall Co. v. Swingler, 173 Md. 490, 197 A. 105
(1938).
For helpful annotations, see 77 A.L.R.2d 7, 77 A.L.R.2d 215, 80
A.L.R.2d 681 and 81 A.L.R.2d 299.
5. Notice of Breach of Warranty
A [seller] [manufacturer] is not liable for a breach of warranty
unless the buyer gave him notice of such breach within a reasonable
time after the buyer knew, or as a reasonable person ought to have
known of the alleged [defect in the goods] [breach of warranty]. What
amounts to a reasonable time depends on the circumstances and the
kind of product involved.
Notice may be oral or in writing; no particular form of notice is
required. It merely must inform the seller of the alleged breach of
warranty. Whether the buyer gave this information to the seller and if
so whether he acted within reasonable time in this case is for you to
determine.
Paragraph 3 is not necessary if instruction VIII b 7 c has been given.
Comment: Lynx, Inc. v. Ordnance Prods., Inc., 273 Md. 1, 327 A.2d
502 (1974). See also Smith v. Butler, 19 Md. App. 467, 311 A.2d 813
(1973); MD. ANN. CODE, Comm. L. Art., § 2-607(3)(a). Notice by
buyer (or by a third party beneficiary of a buyer's warranty) must be
given within a reasonable time after the alleged breach. The institution
of an action to recover damages is not to be regarded as a notice of a
breach; notice is a condition precedent to the right to bring the action.
Lynx, Inc. v. Ordnance Prods., Inc., supra.
6. Special Limiting Effects-Defenses
a. Effect of User's Allergy
Any warranty that the goods involved in this case possessed certain
characteristics or were suitable for a certain purpose was based on the
assumption that the goods would be used by a normal person. There is
no breach of warranty when a product is harmless to a normal person.
A person cannot recover damages for breach of warranty if the injury
or damage resulted solely from an allergy or physical sensitivity to
which normal persons are not subject.
Comment: This instruction is not applicable to products sold or
designed for use by allergic persons. Implied warranty of fitness does
not extend to an illness attributable to a peculiar allergy or idiosyncrasy
of a user that was not reasonably foreseeable by the manufacturer. See,
e.g., Ray v. J. C. Penney Co., 274 F.2d 519 (10th Cir. 1959).
For helpful annotations, see 79 A.L.R.2d 431 and 79 A.L.R.2d 482.
b. Effect of Improper Use
Any warranty of the goods involved in this case was based on the
assumption that they would be used in a reasonable manner appropriate
to the purpose for which they were intended. A person cannot recover
damages for breach of warranty if the injury or damage he suffered
resulted solely from his improper use of the goods.
Comment: The essential question is whether the plaintiff used the
product in such a way as to come within the scope of the warranty.
c. Effect of Use After Defect is or Should be Known
A person using a product after he knew or should have known of the
defect or condition which he claims was a breach of warranty, may not
recover unless a person of ordinary prudence would use the product
despite such knowledge.
Comment: As a general rule, no recovery can be had for personal
injuries resulting from the unreasonable use of a warranted article
known to be defective. See Erdman v. Johnson Bros. Radio and
Television Co., 260 Md. 190, 271 A.2d 744 (1970).
7. Definitions
a. Sale or Contract for Sale
A sale is a transfer of goods or an agreement to transfer goods in the
future to a buyer for a price. In this case [it has been established that]
[it is for you to determine whether] a sale of _was made
by _ as seller, to , as buyer at the time and place
alleged by the plaintiff.
Comment: MD. ANN. CODE, Comm. L. Art., § 2-106 (1975). See also
Giant Food, Inc. v. Washington Coca-Cola. Bottling Co., 273 Md. 592,
332 A.2d 1 (1975).
b. Goods
As used in these instructions the term "goods" means any personal
property [including food]. The word "goods" is used interchangeably
with the words "product" and "article". [The term "goods" includes
the - involved in this case.]
Comment: MD. ANN. CODE, Comm. L. Art., § 2-105(1) (1975).
c. Seller and Buyer
As used in these instructions, the word "seller" includes the
manufacturer of the product involved [and the word "buyer" includes
the user or consumer of the product].
Comment: MD. ANN. CODE, Comm. L. Art., § 2-103(1) (1975).
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d. Warranty in General-Sale
One of the elements of a sale of goods may be an affirmation of fact
or promise by the seller that the goods possess certain characteristics.
Such an affirmation of fact or promise is called a warranty. It may be
made expressly in so many words by the seller or it may be implied
from the circumstances of the sale.
Comment: MD. ANN. CODE, Comm. L. Art., § 2-313 (1975).
e. Warranty in General in Contracts
Other Than Sales
One of the elements of a contract to may be an affirmation
of fact or promise that the [goods] [ I possess certain
characteristics. Such an affirmation of fact or promise is called a
warranty. It may be made expressly in so many words or it may be
implied from the circumstances of the contract.
Comment: This instruction can be used where the contract involved is
not a sale. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE, Comm. L. Art., § 2-314 (1975).
Cf. Bona v. Graefe, 264 Md. 69, 285 A.2d 607 (1972)-exemplifies
inapplicability of § 2-314 to bailments prior to July 1, 1974.
C. STRICT LIABILITY IN TORT
1. Elements of Liability
The [manufacturer] [retailer] of an article who places it on the
market for use under circumstances where he knows that such article
will be used without inspection for defects in the particular part,
mechanism, or design which is claimed to have been defective, is liable
for injuries proximately caused by defects in the manufacture or design
of the article which caused it to be unreasonably dangerous and unsafe
for its intended use and of which the user was not aware, provided the
article was being used for the purpose for which it was designed and
intended to be used.
The plaintiff has the burden of establishing by a preponderance of
the evidence all of the facts necessary to prove the foregoing condition.
Comment: Instruction VIII C 2 should also be given.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A (1965). However, such is
not applicable to design defects in motor vehicles. Volkswagen of
America, Inc. v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 321 A.2d 737 (1974); Frericks v.
General Motors Corp., 274 Md. 288, 336 A.2d 118 (1975).
2. Unreasonably Dangerous Condition-Defined
An article is unreasonably dangerous if it is so dangerous that a
reasonable man would not sell the product if he knew the risks
involved; or to put it another way dangerous to an extent beyond that
19751 Pattern Jury Charges 113
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which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer with the
knowledge common to the community as to the product's character-
istics.
Comment: This definitional instruction should be given in conjunction
with instruction VIII C 1.
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